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I.
INTRODUCTION
Avocados have become a staple of the American diet. From guacamole at a Mexican restaurant, to a fancy toast or sushi topper, it is
versatile and a good source of healthy fats.1 Consumption of avocados in the United States has doubled in the past 10 years.2 However,
where the U.S. was once the biggest producer of its own avocados,
Mexico now provides a majority of the U.S. supply of avocados.3
Over 75% of Mexico’s annual export volume is sent to the U.S.4
Specifically, the State of Michoacán, on the Western edge of Mexico, has become the largest producer because the rich volcanic soil,
almost year-round sunshine, and timely rainfall create a microclimate that allows for year-round avocado production.5 This microclimate is also home to pine and fir forests.6 In light of the rapid increase in demand for avocados, Mexican farmers have begun to
plant young avocado trees beneath the forest canopy, and then gradually remove forest to allow the avocado trees to flourish with better
sunlight.7
These forest-supplanting farm practices violate Mexico’s Ley
General de Desarrollo Forestal Sustenable (“LGDFS”).8 This act,
1

Kris Gunnars, 12 Proven Health Benefits of Avocado, HEALTHLINE (June
4, 2017), http://www.healthline.com/nutrition/12-proven-benefits-of-avocado.
2
Avocado imports grow to meet increasing U.S. demand, U.S. DEP’T OF
AGRIC.. ECONO. RES. SERV., https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/chart-gallery/gallery/chart-detail/?chartId=78928, (last updated Sept. 1, 2016).
3
Jackie Wattles, Guess Where All Those Avocados Come From, CNN
MONEY (Jan. 27, 2017) http://money.cnn.com/2017/01/27/news/economy/avocados-trump-mexico/index.html.
4
US Dep’t Agric. Foreign Agric. Service, GLOBAL AGRIC. INFO. NETWORK
REPORT NO. MX6040, (Dec. 1, 2016) available at https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Avocado%20Annual_Mexico%20City_Mexico
_11-30-2016.pdf.
5
Avocado Journey Picking avocados, AVOCADOS FROM MEXICO, https://avocadosfrommexico.com/avocados/avocado-journey/.
6
Mark Stevenson, In Mexico, high avocado prices fueling deforestation,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 10, 2016), Press, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/9176bc
7479e048508203f10a68da6fa7/mexico-high-avocado-prices-fueling-deforestation.
7
Id.
8
See Forest Conservation in Mexico: Ten years of Payments for Ecosystem
Service, CASE STUDIES ON REMUNERATION OF POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES (RPE)/
PAYMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES (PES), http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/pes-project/docs/FAO_RPE-PES_PSAH-Mexico.pdf

2017]

DEFORESTATION CAUSED BY ILLEGAL AVOCADO FARMING

91

translated as the General Act for Sustainable Forestry Development,
targets areas with a high risk of deforestation and vulnerable ecosystems, and promotes conservation, protection, and restoration
while encouraging production, cultivation, and forestry management.9 The LGDFS incorporates a Payment for Ecosystem Services
(“PES”) system that has proven successful in reducing deforestation
in other countries.10 These systems pay farmers to not use their land,
if said land provides an ecological service.11 However, with such
high demand and potential profit from growing and selling avocados, it seems the benefits farmers received under Mexico’s PES no
longer outweigh the benefit of using their land for cultivation.
This article explores whether Mexico’s PES system is viable in
its current state as it applies to avocado farmers, and discusses potential improvements and alternatives. Part II will outline the development of LGDFS, the implementation of the PES system, and the
rise of avocado farming in Mexico. Part III examines PES systems
around the world, and alternative systems used to prevent or repair
deforestation. Part IV analyzes the LGDFS and PES system in Mexico, comparing it to successful PES systems or alternatives to determine why Mexico’s system has failed in Michoacán. Finally, Part V
develops recommendations for the LGDFS and avocado farming in
Mexico.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

Adoption of the LGDFS and Implementation of PES
Environmental protection in Mexico has made drastic improvements over the last 20 years. In 1987, the government amended Article 27 of the federal constitution to allow for the regulation and
utilization of private land in order to preserve and restore ecological

9

See Id.; see also Szekely ET AL, BIODIVERSITY, ECOSYSTEMS, AND
CONSERVATION IN NORTHERN MEXICO, 87-101, at 95 (Jean-Luc E. Carton et al.
eds., 2005).
10
See Forest Conservation in Mexico, supra note 8.
11
Kelly Carlson, Ridding PES Systems of the “Pay to Pollute” Principle:
PES Optimization Strategies, 16 Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y 23, 23 (2015).
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balance.12 In 1988, the General Act for Ecological Balance and the
Protection of the Environment (“LGEEPA”) created constitutional
provisions regarding the preservation and restoration of the environment.13 Among its guarantees, LGEEPA defines principles of environmental policy and instruments for its application, regulates the
establishment and management of protected areas, and seeks to ensure prevention of pollution.14 LGEEPA has been revised and
amended several times since its establishment. Article 19 outlines a
plan for zoning by enacting national, regional, local, and marine
ecological land zoning programs.15 Furthermore, Articles 44-77 protect biodiversity and ecosystems through the creation of natural protected areas.16 Article 78 of LGEEPA states that the Secretary for
the Environment and Natural Resources shall create and implement
ecological restoration programs in areas showing signs of deforestation through participation with land owners, users, public or private
organizations, local governments or other interested parties.17
LGDFS, enacted under Article 27 of the federal constitution, replaced the 1992 Forestry Act.18 Its purpose is to “regulate and promote the conservation, protection, restoration, production, arrangement, cultivation, management, and exploitation of Mexico’s forest
12

Szekely, supra note 9, at 87; see also Constitutión Política de los Estados
Unidos Mexicanos, CP, art. 27, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 05-021917, últimas reformas DOF 10-02-2014 (Mex).
(“The Nation shall at all times have the right to impose on private property the
modalities dictated by the public interest, as well as to regulate, for social benefit,
the utilization of the natural elements susceptible of appropriation, in order to
make an equitable distribution of Public wealth . . . to preserve and restore ecological balance . . . “) (“La Nación tendrá en todo tiempo el derecho de imponer a
la propiedad privada las modalidades que dicte el interés público, así como el de
regular, en beneficio social, el aprovechamiento de los elementos naturales susceptibles de apropiación, con objeto de hacer una distribución equitativa de la
riqueza pública . . . para preservar y restaurar el equilibrio ecológico . . . “).
13
Szekely, supra note 9, at 95; see generally Ley General del Equilibrio Ecológico y La Protección al Ambiente [LGEEPA], Diario Oficial de la Federación,
28-1-1988 (Mex.).
14
Szekely, supra note 9, at 88.
15
LGEEPA, supra note 13, at art. 19 Bis, p. 17.
16
See id. at 29-42.
17
Id. at 42.
18
Szekely, supra note 9, at 95; see generallyLey General de Desarrollo Forestal Sustenable [LGDFS], Diario Oficial de la Federación,,[DOF], 25-2-2003,
últimas reformas DOF 24-1-2017, (Mex.).
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ecosystems and associated resources, as well as to distribute jurisdiction among the federal, state, and municipal government . . . “19
Mexico’s National Forestry Commission first established a PES system through the Hydrological Ecosystem Services Program.20 Since
its inception, it has evolved beyond hydrological ecosystems and
now also targets areas with high risk of deforestation, vulnerable
ecosystems, and indigenous communities.21 Its incorporation into
the LGDFS in Article 121 states that landholders, municipalities, or
other owners of forest or preferably forestland, as well as those who
have authority to use the land for forest resources, are responsible
for the health of the forest.22 It also states that where the forest is at
risk, the Commission will take over the land, and pay corresponding
consideration, such as tax credit or recovery through the Commission.23 Article 133 states that the Secretary shall promote the development of a market for environmental goods and services that compensate for the benefits provided by owners and holders of forest
resources . . . 24 Together, the provisions of the LGDFS provide for
repayment to land owners for preservation of their forestlands. Furthermore, Article 138 states that the government will establish incentives and credit instruments that will be evaluated by the legislature annually to create long-term incentives for increased forestry.25
Additionally, Article 142 creates the Mexican Forest Fund as the
instrument for promoting and collecting funds for PES programs.26
The funds are supplied from the collection of fees under Mexico’s
Federal Rights Law Article 223, which collects a fee for the use or
exploitation of national waters in accordance with the applicable
water availability zone.27 Fees under this scheme range from $15.19
19

Szekely, supra note 9, at 95; see also LGEEPA at art. 73 XXIX.
See Forest Conservation in Mexico, supra note 8,(explaining the development of PES by the National Forestry Commission “Comisión Nacional Forestal”).
21
Id.
22
LGDFS, supra note 18, at 49.
23
Id.Id
24
Id. at 53.
25
Id. at 55.
26
See Forest Conservation in Mexico, supra note 8.
27
See Id.; see also Ley Federal de Derechos [hereinafter LFD], art. 223, Diario Oficial de la Federación,,[DOF], 31-12-1981, últimas reformas DOF 24-12017 (Mex.).
20
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per cubic meter in Zone 1 to $1.75 per cubic meter in Zone 4.28 The
Mexican Forest Fund may also receive contributions from Mexico’s
federal, state, and municipal governments, credits and donations
from national and international organizations, private or charitable
donation, and contributions from taxes imposed on imported forest
goods.29
B.

Growing Demand for Avocados from Mexico
Over the past 15 years, demand for avocados in the U.S. has
steadily increased.30 In 2014 the sales of Hass avocados in the U.S.,
which make up 95% of avocado consumption, soared to 1.9 billion
pounds, or 4.25 billion avocados.31 This is double the amount sold
in 2005 and quadruple the sales in 2000.32 Some of this dramatic
increase can be explained by the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”). In 1994, NAFTA lifted all
tariff and quantitative restrictions on agricultural goods.33 Some estimates suggest that over 85% of avocados in the U.S. come from
Mexico.34
Along with such high demand comes high price for consumers.
In 2004 the average price of an avocado was under a dollar.35 Now
averages range from $1.00 to $1.25. Between the years 2001 and
2010, avocado production in Michoacán tripled, but exports increased tenfold.36 In 2015 Mexico exported 736,421 metric tons of

28

LFD, supra note 27.
LGDFS, supra note 18, at 57.
30
See Roberto A. Ferdman, The rise of the avocado, America’s new favorite
fruit, THE WASHINGTON POST: WONKBLOG (Jan. 22, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/01/22/the-sudden-rise-of-the-avocadoamericas-new-favorite-fruit/.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Mexico, U.S.D.A. FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., http://www.fas.usda.gov/regions/mexico.
34
Ferdman, supra note 30.
35
Avocado Shipment Volume Data 2004, Hass Avocado Board (Last updated
Jan. 1, 2016), http://www.hassavocadoboard.com/shipment-data/historical-shipment-volume/2004.
36
Stevenson, supra note 6.
29
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avocados, with 584,252 going to the U.S. alone.37 This is a total increase of 178,702 metric tons compared to the previous year’s exports.38 Comparatively, California in the same time produced only
164,000 tons.39 This steady annual increase in production incentivizes rural farmers to expand their avocado growth into other suitable
areas. Covering 23% of the state, Michoacán alone boasts more than
30,000 avocado orchards.40 In the 2015/2016 growing season, it is
estimated that Michoacán planted 134,941 hectares of avocado orchards.41 This far surpasses any other growing state in Mexico, with
the next highest producing state, Jalisco, only growing avocado on
17,041 hectares.42
C.

Forest Preservation and Avocado Farming
Mexico is one of the five most biologically diverse countries in
the world.43 Over 33% of its total land area is covered by forest.44
Despite seemingly slowing rates of deforestation, rates of loss vary
by area, and some parts of the country continue to experience high
rates of deforestation.45 Between 1990 and 2005, Mexico lost 6.9%

37
Avocado Annual: Mexican Avocado Industry Continues to Enjoy Strong
Growth, U.S.D.A.USDA,FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV.: GLOBAL ARGRIC. INFO.
NETWORK (Nov. 24, 2015).
38
Avocado Annual: Mexican Exports Continue to Grow, U.S.D.A.,FOREIGN
AGRIC. SERV.: GLOBAL ARGRIC. INFO. NETWORK (Nov. 26, 2014).
39
Hayley Boriss et al., Avocados, AGRIC. MARKETING RESOURCE CTR.,
http://www.agmrc.org/commodities-products/fruits/avocados/ (last updated Jan.
2016).
40
See Secretaría de Economía, Michoacán de Ocampo, (2016)
http://mim.promexico.gob.mx/work/models/mim/Documentos/PDF/mim
/FE_MICHOACAN_vfi.pdf.
41
Avocado Annual: Greater Volume of Mexican Avocados to the U.S. Market, U.S.D.A.,FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV.: GLOBAL AGRIC. INFO. NETWORK (Dec. 1,
2016).
42
Id.
43
REDD in Mexico, THE RED DESK, http://theredddesk.org/countries/mexico
(last visited Oct. 14, 2016).
44
Id.
45
Id.
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of its forest cover.46 Approximately 20,000 hectares of forest in Michoacán are converted to agricultural use each year.47 In the years
2000-2010 it was estimated that the expansion of avocado farming
contributed to 1,700 acres of deforestation per year.48
Agriculture makes up 3.18% of Mexico’s total GDP.49 Although
this reflects a relatively small portion of the GDP, roughly one half
of the country’s rural population is employed in the agriculture industry.50 Within that industry, avocados and chilies are tied as the
fourth most exported agricultural products, each respectively comprising 4% of Mexico’s total agricultural exports.51 Avocados have
been a staple of the Mexican diet for almost 10,000 years, and have
been actively cultivated for over 5,000 years.52 Mexico’s generally
warm climate makes it the perfect place for avocados to grow year
round. The presence of four distinct microclimates found in Michoacán along the Trans-Atlantic volcanic belt allows avocados to grow
during each annual season. However, this area is also the climate in
which pine-oak forests thrive.53 The high levels of volcanic activity
gave rise to the microhabitats that have been essential for the development of highly diverse ecosystems.54 These areas have been
logged for their wood, and cleared for agricultural uses 55 such as
avocado orchards. Farmers begin by clearing the forest floor to plant
the seeds.56 Once the avocado trees begin to grow, the forest pine
and oak trees overhead are cleared to allow the avocado trees to
46

Mexico, MONGABAY, http://rainforests.mongabay.com/deforestation/archive/Mexico.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2016).
47
Deforestation for Avocados in Mexico is Much Higher Than Expected, Authorities Warn, ABC News (Oct. 31, 2016) http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-1101/mexico-deforestation-for-avocados-much-higher-than-thought/7983012.
48
Stevenson, supra note 6.
49
World Bank ET AL., Climate-Smart Agriculture in Mexico, WORLD BANK
GROUP,
(2014),
http://sdwebx.worldbank.org/climateportal/documents/
CLIMATE_SMART_MEX.pdf.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
A Brief History of the Avocado, AVOSEEDO (May 5, 2015),
https://www.avoseedo.com/a-brief-history-of-the-avocado/.).).
53
Valero ET AL, Southern and North America: Southern Mexico, WWF,
http://www.worldwildlife.org/ecoregions/nt0310 (last visited Oct. 14, 2016).
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
See Stevenson, supra note 6.
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flourish.57 A Hass avocado tree can grow to 15-20 feet tall, with a
width of 5-8 feet when fully grown.58 They require sunlight and thus
cannot survive in the shadows of the pine-oak forest.59
III.

A PRIMER ON PAYMENT FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICES

A.

The Basics
Simply stated, Payment for Ecosystem Services (“PES”) systems are a method of conservation through incentives.60 A beneficiary pays the owner or manager of land, soil, air, or any other resource, in exchange for an ecosystem service.61 Sven Wunder, a
Principal Scientist and Economist for the Center for International
Forestry Research (“CIFOR”), set forth a definition of PES systems
in his paper, Payments for environmental services: Some nuts and
bolts.62 He defines a PES system as:
1. a voluntary transaction where
2. a well-defined ecosystem service (or land use likely to secure
that service)
3. is being bought by a (minimum one) ecosystem service buyer
4. from a (minimum one) ecosystem service provider (seller)
5. if and only if the ecosystem service provider secures ecosystem service provision (conditionally). 63
This system of voluntary trading or exchange of resources between a buyer and seller is not unlike any other purchasing system,
but the commodities are what set PES apart from any other trade
system. An ecosystem service is any benefit that can be derived from
57

See Stevenson, supra note 6.
Hass Avocado Tree, Fast-Growing-Trees, http://www.fast-growingtrees.com/Hass-Avocado-Trees.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2016).
59
See Stevenson, supra note 6.
60
UK DEP’T FOR ENV’T, FOOD & RURAL AFFAIRS, PAYMENTS FOR
ECOSYSTEM SERVICES: A BEST PRACTICE GUIDE, 9 (2013),
https://www.cbd.int/financial/pes/unitedkingdom-bestpractice.pdf.
61
Id.
62
Sven Wunder, Payment for Environmental Services: Some Nuts and Bolts,
CTR. FOR INT’L FORESTRY RES.,
. CIFOROccasional Paper No. 42, 3 (2005), http://www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/OccPapers/OP-42.pdf.
63
Id.
58
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the natural environment, whether it’s food, water, timber, air, recreation, tourism, or aesthetics.64 Wunder elaborates that the service or
benefit to be bought has to be a directly measurable service, such as
tons of carbon stored, or a cap that will help provide that service.65
These benefits can be broken into four general categories: environmental goods, regulating services, supporting services, and cultural
services.66 Environmental goods include food, fresh water, fuel, and
fiber, while regulating services can range from climate and water
purification to flood and disease regulation.67 Supporting services
encompass nutrient cycling, soil formation, and primary production,
and finally, cultural services protect the aesthetic, spiritual, educational and recreational aspects of any given ecosystem.68 Increased
biodiversity can be sorted into most of these categories of benefits
either as the primary ecosystem service provided, or an inadvertent
benefit created through the regulation of a different environmental
service.69
The configuration of any PES is unique as there are several variables that can contribute to the system. First, the participants will
vary.70 The number of buyers and sellers will range from a “one-toone” set up, where a company or government enters into an agreement with a single seller to provide a service; “one-to-many” where
again a corporation or government enters into an agreement, but this
time with many sellers or providers to pay for an ecosystem service;
“many-to-one” where multiple buyers invest in an ecosystem service from one provider, and finally, “many-to-many” where multiple buyers and multiple providers mutually agree to purchase and
provide ecosystem services.71 Second, the systems can be developed
on different scales. The system can be international, where a government or corporation pays a provider in a different country; na-

64

UK DEP’T FOR ENV’T , supra note 60, at 10.
See generally Wunder, supra note 62.
66
See Forest Trends ET AL, Payments for Ecosystem Services Getting started,
UNEP primer.2 (2008), http://www.forest-trends.org/documents/files/doc_
2347.pdf.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
See Wunder, supra note 62.
70
UK DEP’T FOR ENV’T, supra note 60, at 20.
71
Id.
65
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tional, where a government pays the provider for ecosystem services; catchment, where users pay for ecosystem service management; or local, where residents collectively fund and oversee local
ecosystem management.72 These systems can be funded through
public schemes financed by governments, privately through corporations or groups, or through a cooperative scheme where governments and private parties work together to pay for ecosystem services.73 The systems by which the sellers are able to provide the
ecosystem services vary as well. There can be area-based schemes,
where the contracts use caps on land.74 Area-based schemes are often implemented through conservation concessions, easements, protected catchments, or forest-carbon plantations.75 Product-based
schemes allow the consumer to pay a premium for a product that is
certified to be environmentally friendly.76 Additionally, use-restricting schemes reward the providers for conserving their land by capping agricultural or resource production, or protecting the area completely.77 If the purchaser wants to protect the area completely, they
are paying the provider for their conservation opportunity costs from
not using the land productively.78 Finally, asset-building schemes
aim to restore an area’s ecosystem services.79 Given the factors
above, there are a multitude of potential combinations of types of
PES systems that could be created and implemented. Figure 1 below
provides an example of how a PES system works when applied to
payments for watershed services. This figure illustrates the flow of
resources from a downstream community with the incentive to pay
for the benefit of clean water, to an upstream community with the
ability to provide the service through a variety of means.

72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

Id. at 16-17.
Id.
Wunder, supra note 62, at 7.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Wunder, supra note 62, at 7.
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Figure 1: PES as applied to watershed services.80
PES systems are most likely to emerge where there is potential
to increase the supply of a particular ecosystem service, there is a
demand for the service, the service has value to one or more buyers,
and the suppliers are able to provide the service to meet demand.81
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment conducted by the World
Resources Institute in 2005 found that over 60% of environmental
services were being degraded faster than they could recover.82 This
deficiency in ecosystem services thus created the need for a system
that could halt the degradation, conserve the remaining resources,
and eventually begin to replenish them. As the need for new methods of conservation arose, the concept of PES systems became more
popular because as ecosystems shrink, the services they provide become increasingly scarce, and increasingly valuable.83 In fact, the
scientific journal Nature estimates the global value of ecosystem

80
81
82
83

UK DEP’T FOR ENV’T, supra note 60, at 13.
Id. at 16.
Forest Trends, supra note 66, at 2.
Wunder, supra note 62, at 1.
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services to be between $16-54 trillion per year.84 However, assessing the economic value of a specific ecosystem service may be
difficult because the market does not yet exist, or the service is one
where the benefits may not accrue for many years.85
Furthermore, PES systems are susceptible to different kinds of
issues. First, the offering entity may offer payments that are too low
to induce landowners into participating in socially desirable land
uses.86 When this happens, landowners have no incentive to change
the way they use their land, and the undesirable use continues. Second, a beneficiary may pay a landowner for environmental services
at a rate higher than the actual value of the service.87 These two
problems cause social inefficiency because overall welfare is reduced over its potential limit.88 Finally, beneficiaries risk paying a
landowner for practices that would have been adopted anyway.89
When this happens, the program may attract landowners who would
have adopted the practice anyway, so funds that could have been
used for efficient change elsewhere are wasted.90
IV.

PES SYSTEMS AT WORK AND ALTERNATIVES FOR
CONSERVATION

A.

PES in Costa Rica
Costa Rica is often revered as home of the most successful PES
program in existence. Motivated by a loss of over 50% of the country’s forested land in less than a century, Costa Rica implemented

84

Robert Costanza ET AL., The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and
Natural Capital, 387 NATURE 253, 253 (May 15, 1997) (estimating value of
world’s ecosystem services at $33 trillion per annum, with confidence interval of
$16 trillion to $54 trillion).
85
THE STATE OF FOOD AND AGRICULTUREPAYINGPAYING, at 34 (FAO Agric.
Series No. 38FoodFood, 2007).
86
Stefano Pagiola, Payment for Environmental Services in Costa Rica,
MPRA, at 8, https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2010/1/MPRA_paper_2010.pdf,
(posted on March 6, 2007).
87
Id.
88
Id. at 9.
89
Id. at 8.
90
Id. at 9.
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legal reforms, including an early form of PES.91 In the 1970s, Costa
Rica began using tax rebates to provide an incentive for timber plantations to promote reforestation.92 This program was expanded by
the creation of the Forest Credit Certificate, which allowed tax credits for smaller landowners who participated in conservation activities on their property.93 Different variations of this tax credit system
developed over time, but in 1992, Forest Protection Certificates
were introduced to promote forest conservation over timber production.94 This important legislation banned enrolled land from being
exploited in any way, except for ecotourism.95 This prior legislation
created a system of payments for reforestation, which is a type of
ecosystem service, and created managing bodies, thus building a
solid foundation for the smooth implementation of a PES system.96
Forest Law No. 7575, enacted in 1996, officially established the
national PES program.97 Using the knowledge and foundation that
had been built by the previous systems of tax rebates and credits, the
law introduced a system by which the government could offer contracts to land owners where the government would provide financial
incentives in exchange for services derived from the land.98 The law
explicitly recognized these four services: (i) mitigation of greenhouse emissions; (ii) hydrological services; (iii) biodiversity conservation; and (iv) provision of scenic beauty for recreation and ecotourism.99 The law also establishes the National Fund for Forest Financing (“FONAFIFO”) as the managing agency for the new PES
91

Karen Bennett & Norbert Henninger, Payment for Ecosystem Services in
Costa Rica and Forest Law No. 7575; Key Lessons for Legislators, WORLD
RESOURCES INST. (2009), at 3, http://www.agora-parl.org/sites/default/files
/090422_e-parliament_forests_initiative.pdf.
92
Pagiola, supra note 86, at 2.
93
Brian C. Steed, Government Payments for Ecosystem Services – Lessons
From Costa Rica, 23 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 177, 188 (2007) (explaining Costa
Rican policy development, beginning with the, Certificado de Abono [Forest
Credit Certificate]). [hereinafter CAF]
94
Bennet & Henninger, supra note 91, at 2 (explaining Costa Rican policy
preceding Forest Law No. 7575, Certificado para la Proteccion del Bosque [Forest
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program.100 FONAFIFO is a semi-autonomous agency with independent legal status.101 Its governing board has one representative
each from the Ministry of Environment and Energy, the Ministry of
Agriculture, and the National Banking System, as well as two representatives from the private sector, who are appointed by the board
of directors of the National Forestry Office.102
FONAFIFO has become the central management hub for the
Costa Rican PES, and all activities relating to the program are coordinated through that organization, except for the budget, which is
managed by the Ministry of Finance.103 The budget available for the
PES program has grown exponentially since the program’s inception in 1996. At that time, the budget was approximately $2.87 million US dollars.104 Since then, the annual budget has grown to over
$25 million US dollars.105
Forest Law No. 7575 authorizes FONAFIFO to finance the program through a variety of means, including tax revenues, grants,
loans, and agreements with private sector participants.106 Article 69
of Forest Law No. 7575 assigns 1/3 of tax revenue generated from
gasoline taxes to the PES program.107 However, this was later modified to provide that 3.5% of the tax on gasoline would be assigned
to the PES program.108 Article 47 also allows for financial contributions from the State through budgeting, donations or credits from
national or international organizations and businesses, and credits

100

Id.; see also Ley No 7575, art. 22, D.O., 16 de abril de 1996, p. 3 (Costa
Rica) [hereinafter FONAFIFO] (establishing el Fondo Nacional de Financiamento Forestal as the PES managing agency).
101
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Asignación Presupuestaria Para CAF y PSA por Fuente de Financiamiento, del Programa de Pago por Servicios Ambientales, en Colones,
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obtained by FONAFIFO.109 Each of the four services provided under Forest Law No. 7575 (carbon sequestration, hydrological services, biodiversity, and scenic beauty) have their own sources of
funding.110 For carbon sequestration, the fossil fuel tax discussed
above generates the equivalent of approximately $10 million US
dollars annually for FONAFIFO.111 Costa Rica is also a participant
in the global carbon market to offset other countries’ greenhouse gas
emissions with funding from Norwegian power producers, the Italian firm Lifegate, and the World Bank.112 Funding for payments for
water services comes from the water users, and in Costa Rica’s case,
the hydropower company Energía Global, who pays landowners upstream of the company’s hydrological plants.113 Payments for biodiversity have been provided by grants from the World Bank, the
Global Environmental Facility, the German aid agency KfW, and
from Conservation International.114 With this flexibility,
FONAFIFO has worked to move away from voluntary payments
from beneficiaries and towards compulsory payments through tax
and tariffs for users in the area where the money for a service is
generated.115 Setting up systems for long-term financial stability is
crucial in creating a lasting PES system capable of effecting change.
Since the implementation of the PES system, an average of
60,000 hectares of private property have been conserved every
year.116 This means that over 1 million hectares of land have been
part of the PES program at one point or another since its inception.
In 2013, forest protection made up 67% of the total number of contracts allocated, making it the predominant environmental service
provided under the program.117
There are many factors that contribute to Costa Rica’s success.
First, the law establishing the PES system clearly recognizes and
109
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articulates the types of services included in the scheme.118 Understanding the purpose and goal of the regulation helps focus and narrow what mechanisms can be used to reach those goals. Second,
Costa Rica created FONAFIFO to manage the program.119 Having
a central management system is important for efficiency and governance. Originally, FONAFIFO worked with NGOs and partner institutions to contract with landowners.120 At that time, it took
FONAFIFO and the partner institutions up to nine months to process
contracts for new PES participants.121 Several years later, authority
for the entire PES process was delegated to FONAFIFO in order to
increase efficiency, and this delegation has proved successful as the
average application now takes an average of 75 days to process from
submission to first payment.122 Third, Costa Rica pays landholders
to implement specific land use practices that are likely to create ecosystem services, rather than making direct payment for ecosystem
services, which can be hard to measure and may take years of effort
before such benefits are tangible.123 Currently, the PSA program is
so popular that FONAFIFO cannot grant a contract to every landowner who applies because financing is not available for more than
a quarter of applicants.124 As such, Costa Rica has created a system
that prioritizes applicants according to a set of criteria assessed annually, depending on the service activity that is needed.125 These
criteria measure which environmental service is to be provided and
the importance of that service, whether the area serves as a species
habitat, the proximity to existing protected areas, and carbon sequestration potential, as well as whether the applicant is part of a particularly poor district.126 FONAFIFO also has strict eligibility standards for applicants. Minimum land requirements, proof of identity
and ownership, and submission of monitoring plans are just a few of
these eligibility standards.127 Once applicants have been accepted
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
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Id. at 5.
Id.
Bennett & Henninger, supra note 91, at 5.
See Pagiola, supra note 86, at 8.
Bennett & Henninger, supra note 91, at 5.
Bennett & Henninger, supra note 91, at 4.
Id. at 8.

106

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:89

into the program, FONAFIFO sets terms the landowner must follow
during the length of the contract, and adds in provisions that are
bound to the property title so that the land management continues
even when property is bought and sold during the period of the PES
contract.128 Requiring the contract to run with the land reinforces
Costa Rica’s commitment to ensuring the future creation of ecosystem services that are needed, and increases the likelihood that such
benefits will actually be realized.
Finally, much of Costa Rica’s success can be attributed to
FONAFIFO’s extensive monitoring practices. External organizations conduct audits of the licensed foresters’ work by visiting the
sites, reviewing reports, auditing FONAFIFO paperwork, and using
GIS to monitor properties.129 This kind of oversight keeps both
FONAFIFO and the landowners accountable for the terms set forth
in the contracts to make the PES system effective.
While the Costa Rican system is not without flaws, it has served
as a model for PES systems around the world.130 The foundations
upon which the system is built, and the adaptations and changes that
they have made over time, serve as a good example for other nations
to follow when building and implementing their own systems.
B.

PES in the United States
The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (“ESA”) served as the catalyst for the creation of PES in the United States.131 The ESA identifies and defines species that are in danger of extinction, and aims
to conserve the habitat they depend on.132 If a landowner is in possession of land that serves as critical habitat for a threatened or endangered species, they may be subject to severe penalties under the
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ESA for using the land in a way that threatens that habitat.133 In response, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“USFWS”) works with
State and Federal agencies as well as private landowners to reduce
threats to species before they are listed as endangered.134 The
USFWS also has an array of incentive programs and compliance
markets for landowners to take advantage of once a species has been
designated as endangered in order to offset impacts to existing habitat.135 For example, the Candidate Conservation Agreements with
Assurances Policy provides incentives for non-Federal property
owners to conserve species to prevent them from being listed as endangered.136 Conservation Banks protect lands permanently, and
sell mitigation credits supplied by the landowners of those protected
areas to those who need to meet mitigation requirements elsewhere.137 Finally, Section 6 of the ESA establishes the Cooperative
Endangered Species Conservation Fund, which provides funding to
states to participate in conservation projects on non-Federal lands.138
These programs are examples of PES systems that trade in conservation for alternative forms of incentives, like credits and permits,
instead of monetary payments.
The Federal government, in conjunction with USFWS and the
USDA National Resources Conservation Service (“USDA”), also
set up programs to pay private landowners to protect habitat and biodiversity.139 These programs include the Private Stewardship Program (“PSP”), Landowner Incentives Program (“LIP”), Partners for
Fish and Wildlife (“PFW”), the North American Wetlands Conservation Act Program (“NAWCA”), and the Wildlife Habitat Incentives Program (“WHIP”).140 PSP provides compensation to landowners who voluntarily implement conservation activities that benefit at-risk species on private land.141 LIP is funded and administered
133
D. Evan Mercer, ET AL., Taking Stock: Payments for Forest Ecosystem Services in the United States, FOREST-TRENDS, 16 (Feb. 2011) http://www.foresttrends.org/documents/files/doc_2673.pdf.
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by state wildlife agencies, and offers funding to support state guided
projects that benefit at-risk species on privately owned land.142 In
LIP, landowners provide a 25% match or in-kind contribution to the
fund.143 PFW provides funding for voluntary restoration of wetlands, and other fish and wildlife habitats on private lands.144 In that
program, landowners must match the funding provided, and agree
to retain the restoration projects for at least 10 years.145 Private partners and donors may also offset program costs.146 PFW is a cooperative program where private landowners receive funding and technical support from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service in exchange
for conserving and protecting their land, which has been identified
as containing valuable fish and wildlife habitat.147 Under PFW, private landowners are incentivized to provide for the restoration of
habitat conservation by the Fish and Wildlife Service in conjunction
with private parties, for the benefit of protection of natural resources.148 The NAWCA grants program assists organizations and
individuals in establishing long-term wetland protection projects for
migratory birds.149 Finally, WHIP provides agricultural landowners
with technical and financial support to improve areas that are suitable for fish and wildlife habitat development, forestland, and tribal
land.150
PES policy was further developed in the 1985 Farm Bill, which
created the Conservation Reserve Program (“CRP”).151 The CRP
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provides payments to farmers in exchange for keeping environmentally sensitive land in “conservation uses” for 10-15 years.152 Payment for these conservation activities can manifest as rental payments to landowners, easements, cost-sharing payments, or reimbursement for land enhancement and restoration.153 The Farm Bill
has been revised and renewed over the years. The most recent renewal, the 2014 Farm Bill, consolidated conservation programs for
increased flexibility and efficiency at the local level, and encouraged
agricultural producers to design projects focused on regional
needs.154 Within the first year, the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(“USDA”) announced that over 98% of producers had met the bill’s
requirement to certify conservation compliance.155 The budget for
CRP has grown from $8 million at its inception in 1986, to between
$1.8 and $1.9 billion annually.156
U.S. PES strategy is unlike many of its foreign counterparts,
with heavy focus on federal funding of projects for targeted areas,
which are especially concentrated on agricultural lands. Other PES
systems focus on the positive environmental services created by
such programs while the U.S. focuses on addressing negative impacts of certain kinds of land use.157
152
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C.

PES in Uganda
Uganda launched their first official Payment for Ecosystem Services Fund (“PESF”) in 2015.158 The Minister of Water and Environment for Uganda launched three separate funds with the hopes of
reducing several identified environmental issues, including land
degradation and the effects of climate change.159 The government
will provide payments as an incentive to promote conservation and
restoration of natural resources.160 Uganda suffered massive deforestation in the last century, with increased rates of deforestation beginning in the 1990’s.161 In 1900, 50% of Uganda’s total land area
was forested.162 By 1990 forested area had decreased by half, and
by 2012 only 14.5% of Uganda was forested.163 Furthermore, the
average annual loss of forested land has increased steadily since
1990.164 The rate of deforestation between 2000 and 2010 was 2.6%
per year, one of the highest in the world.165 Agricultural expansion
into the forests, charcoal and firewood collection, infrastructure development, and illegal logging are the major driving causes of deforestation in Uganda.166 Regulation of the forest has proven difficult for the government in the past because approximately 70% of
the forested land in Uganda is privately owned.167 However, this
high proportion of private forest ownership also creates a targeted
market for PES systems providers. The PESF implemented almost
158
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two years ago covered only two districts to start, and will be managed by the Environmental Conservation Trust of Uganda
(“ECOTRUST”).168 ECOTRUST will facilitate communications
between the farmers and reputable purchasers of carbon, with the
hopes that establishing these relationships will create a sustainable
market even after the initial project is phased out.169 The Programme
Officer for ECOTRUST has also invested in diversifying the livelihood of participating farmers by teaching them how to raise chickens and keep bees, and has set up saving and credit systems and water collection systems in the participating communities.170
The new PESF is not the first time a PES system has been tested
in Uganda. Innovations for Poverty Action (“IPA”), a non-profit research group, collaborated with the local Chimpanzee Sanctuary and
Wildlife Conservation Trust (“CSWCT”) to test the impact of PES
on forest conservation in 121 villages within two of Uganda’s 111
districts.171 Sixty villages received payments under the PES program, while sixty-one others served as the comparison group in the
experiment, which lasted two years between 2011-2013.172 CSWCT
offered owners of forested land a contract under which they would
receive the equivalent of $28.00 per hectare of conserved forested
land, a rate competitive with what the landowner would earn for
timber harvested from their land.173 The owners could not cut trees,
and could earn extra money if they reforested portions of their
land.174 CSWCT enforced the contracts by conducting random land
surveys to check for signs of tree cutting.175 IPA’s research found
that despite relatively low levels of participation (approx. 32%), de-
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forestation decreased in the villages where the program was offered.176 Interviews with villagers showed that a majority of the individuals who did not participate had been unaware of the program,
or had problems when signing up, while only a few said they did not
participate because they were not interested.177 This initial project
showed promise, and exposed several issues that would need to be
addressed for a more permanent PES system to be successful. While
other payment schemes have been implemented in Uganda, the
PESF, if adequately managed, funded, and expanded to additional
districts, is likely to produce the best results.
D.

Other Market-Based Incentive Programs

i. REDD+
In 2008, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (“FAO”), the United Nations Development Programme
(“UNDP”), and the United Nations Environment Programme
(“UNEP”) launched the United Nations collaborative initiative on
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
(“UN-REDD”).178 This collaborative group works with developing
countries on meeting the requirements for implementing the
REDD+ program.179 The REDD+ program, which is governed by
the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (“UNFCCC”), is an incentive program for developing countries.180 The primary goal of REDD+ is to change the way developing countries perceive the value of their forests.181 By making the
monetary value of conservation worth more than the land uses that
lead to deforestation, REDD+ creates a financial incentive for “low-
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carbon paths toward sustainable development.”182 Unlike PES systems, which do not focus on only one ecosystem service or benefit,
REDD+ is targeted specifically on carbon emission mitigation and
storage.183 Developing countries receive results-based payments in
exchange for mitigating climate change by reducing carbon emissions from deforestation and forest degradation through sustainable
management of forests.184 REDD+ was developed as a direct result
of increased deforestation in developing nations, where it is estimated that approximately 1.6 billion people depend on forests.185
The program “was initially conceived as a market-based approach
to incentivize private-sector finance for project-level activities,”
much like some forms of PES.186 Over time it grew to be a mechanism that functioned and could be implemented at the national
level.187 Much like PES systems, REDD+ depends on partnerships
and funding from governments, businesses and institutions.188 In
fact, once a REDD+ scheme has been implemented, it can be linked
to a PES program to provide the financial, non-carbon benefits of
REDD+.189 Investors receive carbon market credits from UNFCCC
in exchange for their contribution to a particular REDD program.190
REDD+ recognizes that forests serve as a natural carbon sink,
and thus are an ideal conservation target for reducing carbon emissions or “footprints,” but also serve as a contributor to carbon emissions because the carbon the forest stores while alive is then released
into the atmosphere after they are cut down.191 Therefore, one of the
keystone elements for REDD+ success is the carbon market. Developed countries with little land left to preserve that are in search of a
way to come into compliance with environmental regulations, or are
interested in stock-piling carbon credits for the future, are invited to
182
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purchase carbon credits from the REDD+ program, which promises
that in return for the payment, a certain area of forest in a developing
country will be preserved or restored, and serve as the carbon sink
to offset the excess carbon of the purchasing country.192 By keeping
forests intact, REDD+ provides physical environmental benefits, as
well as financial benefits, which in turn impacts a broad range of
social and economic benefits in the countries where REDD+ is implemented.193
The REDD+ program is implemented in three phases.194 First is
the “Readiness” phase, where countries working with UN-REDD
design national action plans regarding how to implement REDD+,
working on developing REDD+ policies and designing the projects.195 Next is the “Demonstration” phase, where the plans and policies created in phase one are tested.196 Finally, in the “Implementation” phase, the actions tested in phase two are implemented on a
national scale, and results are measured, reported, and verified by
the UNFCCC, who provide results-based payments upon completion of this phase.197 Most REDD+ funding focuses on the first two
phases, readiness and demonstration, which aim to prepare participating countries to be part of the international REDD+ market.198
Because quantification of actual emissions reductions is difficult to
ascertain, as discussed below, funding for the implementation phase
in many countries is not yet contingent on results, but in efforts made
towards mitigating actions by the developing nations.199 However,
as more countries reach phase three, there will need to be a major
shift in funding from the readiness phases to the implementation
phase so that these programs can deliver the results-based funds to
the developing countries in order for the program to maintain longevity.200
192
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The REDD+ program has been questioned and critiqued since
its inception. Concerns include fear of disenfranchisement of groups
indigenous to forested areas, displacement of locals, restriction of
property rights and land uses for those who are entirely dependent
on the forest, and whether the program’s results, if any, can be quantified accurately.201 Although REDD+ sells the idea of carbon being
removed from the atmosphere and locked into forest carbon sinks,
issues of “permanence,” “leakage,” and “additionality” loom in the
background. While these concerns are also applicable to PES systems, they have particular application to REDD+ programs. Carbon
sinks are a temporary solution that lacks permanence because even
if the forest is not cut down, eventually the trees that make up the
forest will die, releasing all of the stored carbon back into the atmosphere.202 “Leakage” is the idea that conserving the forest in one location will lead to deforestation in other unmonitored locations.203
For example, in Bolivia, loggers who were restricted from logging
in one area after REDD was implemented bought new land to log
elsewhere.204 So while REDD+ addresses the issue of deforestation
in key identified areas, there is a risk that those who depend on the
forest will simply move on to other areas where regulations are not
so strict. Therefore leakage can reduce, or even reverse the positive
effects of conservation programs, and undermine REDD+’s effectiveness.205 “Additionality” means that developed countries will
“pay only for changes in carbon stocks that would not otherwise
have taken place.”206 In any program that incentivizes a landowner
to secure an ecosystem service, that activity (which here would be
201
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forest conservation) is deemed “additional” if it would not have happened without the incentive.207 In order to establish additionality,
there must be a baseline from which progress can be measured,
which is difficult because any measurement assumes that the rate of
deforestation would be constant going in the future unless REDD+
was implemented.208 However, assuming that deforestation would
continue at its current rate is unrealistic because of the “complexity
of forest-cover change and the sheer number of forest-cover change
drivers.”209 Other critiques label the U.N. program as a one-trick
pony. A report published by environmental and indigenous rights
organizations states that “the U.N. definition of ‘forest’ does not distinguish between tropical old-growth forest and an industrial monoculture tree plantation . . . this means that if someone is able to
demonstrate that a plantation can store more carbon than an existing
forest . . . the forest’s destruction will be subsidized through
REDD.”210 Furthermore, REDD+ has come under fire in recent
years for mistreatment of indigenous people. GenderCC and UNEP
have reported that indigenous people in Kenya were arrested and
evicted from over 21,000 hectares in 2009.211 Indonesia, China, Panama, Ecuador, Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Bolivia are among the
REDD+ countries that have reported conflicts between the program
and indigenous interests.212
There are many overlapping components and themes between
PES systems and REDD+, yet they remain separate entities. The
programs are so closely related that in 2016 at COP16 in Cancun,
Mexico, representatives from Costa Rica, Mexico, and Ecuador
came together to discuss the experiences and lessons from their own
PES systems to inform the future development of REDD+.213
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REDD+ can take the lessons learned from PES systems, as they have
been tested in the representative countries, with regards to participation agreements; equity or social objectives; trade-offs and synergies between multiple benefits; measuring, reporting, and verification; and sustainable finance.214
Although REDD+ is one of the most well recognized marketbased incentive programs in existence, and has had some success, it
also remains the center of controversy and careful scrutiny. It remains to be seen whether the program can provide the kind of comprehensive management that developing countries need.
ii. Yasuní Program in Ecuador
The Yasuní Initiative (“Initiative”) is an example of a marketbased project gone wrong. Oil accounts for up to 50% of Ecuador’s
exports, and 30% of government revenue comes from oil.215 Yasuní
National Park (“Yasuní”), one of the most bio-diverse areas in the
world, sits on top of the Ishpingo-Tambococha-Tiputini (“ITT”) oilfields, which hold approximately 20% of Ecuador’s total oil reserves.216 It came as a shock to many when, in 2010, Ecuador’s President Correa announced that he would leave the ITT reserves untouched in exchange for $600-$700 million annually, the equivalent
to the expected revenue from exploiting the oil.217 The Yasuní Initiative’s primary goals were to reduce the burning of fossil fuels to
mitigate global warming, preserve biodiversity in the Yasuní, and
mitigate poverty.218 The Initiative would have the positive, yet unintended effect of avoiding deforestation and colonization of the
protected area.219 This unprecedented move was supported by three
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pieces of legislation. First, in 2007, the government banned oil drilling in Yasuní.220 Next, just one year later, Ecuador amended their
Constitution and granted nature and ecosystems the “unalienable
right to exist, flourish, and evolve within Ecuador.”221 This unprecedented change reflected the Ecuadorian belief that their country
could be a leader in green initiatives, protecting the environment
while still building a viable economy.222 Finally, Ecuador enacted a
law that increased government control over the oil sector, providing
Ecuador with 100% ownership of all oil, and paying oil companies
a flat fee for extraction services.223 While all of these laws indicate
that President Correa and the Ecuadorian government were moving
toward a sustainable, bio-diverse, eco-centric future, none of the
laws closed an essential loophole. That loophole allowed drilling in
protected areas like Yasuní if Congress declared such drilling to be
necessary, and approved by the President.224 This loophole would
prove to be a fatal flaw to the Initiative.
The Yasuní ITT Trust Fund was established and ready to receive
contributions from foreign nations on August 3, 2010.225 The Initiative was built to run on contributions from the international community, who would pay to leave the oil in the ITT in exchange for carbon dioxide credits.226 The credits could only be redeemed if the
Ecuadorian government exercised their right, or “Plan B” as President Correa called it, to begin oil exploitation in the ITT.227 The
funds generated from the sale of carbon dioxide credits would in
turn be used for projects like reforestation, conservation, forest management, and social programs for indigenous tribes.228 However,
Ecuador was unable to garnish enough interest and support from the
220
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international community, so Correa ended the program in 2013 and
authorized drilling to begin in the Yasuní ITT.229
The Initiative’s failure might suggest that, simply speaking, the
outside world did not value the environmental services provided by
the ITT sufficiently to make the necessary investments. A closer
look at the events leading up to the Initiative’s failure, however, suggests a host of other factors at play. Although President Correa was
attempting to move Ecuador towards ecological revolution, he retained, and regularly pursued, his “Plan B” – drilling in the ITT
block.230 Pursuing this option failed to show the united front that the
Initiative needed to be successful. Furthermore, that year government presentations made for oil companies were leaked, and showed
that despite the government’s official stance of support for the Initiative, “Correa was betting on its failure and courting oil companies.”231 Having the President promote one agenda while continuing
to pursue its exact opposite created questions and diminished support among the international community.232
Then in 2009, President Correa met with Russian officials and
signed an agreement allowing Russian companies to explore and exploit a tract of land bordering the ITT.233 2009 also saw the Ecuadorian government pass a new mining law that allowed strip mining.234
Again, a lack of consistency between policy and action in both the
deal with Russia and beginning of strip mining created doubts in the
strength of the Initiative, its goals, and its potential for success.
In 2010, President Correa dug himself into deeper trouble when
he announced the process for applying for licenses to drill in the
ITT.235 Furthermore, the Initiative was in its early phases when the
financial crisis of 2008 struck.236 At that time China invested heavily
in Ecuador, and by 2011, 11% of Ecuador’s GDP was owed to Chinese banks, and repayment was expected in the form of crude oil.237
When the Yasuní ITT Trust Fund began accepting payments, a
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woman named Ivonne Baki was in charge of the fundraising effort.238 Described as an “unprincipled political wheeler dealer,” Baki
failed to garner the support needed for successful fundraising, and
was even accused of being a political double agent by trying to help
Chevron bribe the Ecuadorian government for $1 billion in 2011.239
The lack of a united front, constant undermining of the Initiative
through the implementation of counteractive mining and drilling
deals, and a failure to bring in enough financial support were the
direct causes of the Initiative’s failure, and serve as a lesson to other
countries who may attempt to enact such a progressive policy in the
future.
V.

COMPARISON OF MEXICO’S PES TO OTHER CONSERVATION
PROGRAMS

A.

Measuring PES and Conservation Program Effectiveness
As previously stated, PES systems are most likely to emerge
where specific management has the potential to increase the supply
of an ecosystem service, there is a demand for the service, and the
service has value for potential buyers.240 Efficient systems would
ideally require landowner or ecosystem service providers to change
their actions permanently by providing them with enough incentives
to offset the opportunity costs they could receive from not implementing the management practice.241 PES systems will fail if the
desired land use is less profitable to landowners than the existing
land use or readily available alternative uses.242 Finding a balance
that will promote the longevity and success of a PES system requires
finding stable, reliable funding that has the potential to fund the service, ideally as long as the service can be provided. There must be
trust between the service provider and purchaser, and there must be
a market for the service.243 Furthermore, establishing a baseline
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from which conservation can be measured is crucial to understanding whether or not the program is achieving its goal of additionality,
or whether those effects are simply what would have happened even
in the absence of the program.244
While Mexico’s PES program has placed over 3.2 million hectares of land into conservation programs, the program has not been
able to account for the profitability of avocado as a cash crop.245 In
Michoacán, it has become clear that the profitability of farming avocado has outweighed the profitability of participating in PES programs. It may also be the case that these farmers participate in the
PES program, but also farm beneath the tree canopy because oversight of the program is lacking. Regardless of the reason, the demand
for the service of forest conservation has failed to outweigh the demand for avocados.
B.

Best and Worst Practices

i. Setting Up for Success
The strength of the government and economy of the implementing country both play critical roles in the viability of a conservation
program. In most cases, the countries with the highest rates of deforestation are among the world’s most corrupt.246 Since many conservation programs target developing countries, they must be aware
of potential threats to the credibility and effectiveness of the system
implemented. Carbon markets like those established in REDD+
countries are particularly subject to corrupt practices.247 In order to
determine the amount of credits available to trade from a distinct
area, carbon market implementers must make measurements of the
land and extrapolate them to determine the carbon absorption potential.248 This not only leaves room for natural miscalculation error,
but also for the intentional manipulation of calculations in order to
distort the results and create more carbon credits to sell.249 Since the
credit is not a tangible object, but merely an invisible commodity
244
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that rests on assurances with very little capacity for measurement, it
is almost impossible to determine which credits are being offset at
any given time, thus making the error almost impossible to detect.250
Furthermore, corrupt countries with decentralized programs and
little oversight over the sale of carbon credits allow landowners to
sell the same carbon credits into multiple carbon markets.251 One of
REDD+’s major critiques is that sale of carbon credits does not create an overall positive outcome in terms of reducing emissions because it makes the practice of pollution acceptable instead of punishing or motivating polluters to change their practices.252 In corrupt
countries that suffer from the issue of multiple sales of the same
credits, this outcome is especially true.
Finally, lack of a centralized, stable government with a steady
source of funding for any conservation system places potential ecosystem service buyers and investors at a higher risk for fraud.253 Developed countries that have more reliable governance structures are
better suited for successful conservation programs. Governments
where collaboration exists between governments, communities,
businesses, and civil society organizations are ideal for PES implementation.254 Mexico, for example, has established a centralized
“one-to-one” system where the government established the PES
through legislation known as the LGDFS, which is then enforced by
a separate government agency, CONAFOR.255 This government-run
system has helped reduce deforestation by over 50%.256 Similarly,
Costa Rica’s Forest Law No. 7575 applies to the entire country, and
is enforced through a semi-autonomous agency, FONAFIFO, with
250
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a majority of advising members who are representatives of the government.257 The U.S. and Uganda follow suit with ESA’s implemented by USFWS in the U.S., and PESF managed by
ECOTRUST.258 Programs like REDD+ seem to intentionally seek
out developing countries with the hope of intervening and implementing conservation measures before deforestation becomes an epidemic. However noble that intent may be, the risk of corruption and
lack of infrastructure available for successful implementation and
longevity set REDD+ apart from other conservation programs that
function more effectively and efficiently when implemented in developed countries.
ii. Funding
All market-based conservation programs suffer from the same
issue: funding, and lack thereof. An ecosystem service provider
needs assurance that funding will be available to commit to providing the service.259 To preserve the service forever, ecosystem service
buyers, whether they are a government or private entity, needs to
secure steady funding, ideally into infinity.260
Mexico is a one-to-one market system, where the government
pays for ecosystem services under LGDFS.261 While the Biodiversity Endowment Fund (“Fund”) established in 2010 accepts payments from global sources, the funds funnel through CONAFOR to
the landowners.262 Payments are made on an annual basis, but “only
after progress and compliance are verified through site visits and
remote sensing.”263 The Mexican government uses interests generated from the Fund to pay ecosystem providers, and has also promoted local PES mechanisms by matching funds provided by ecosystem service users.264 This local implementation of national goals
and incentives may be a leading reason for Mexico’s overall PES
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success. However, this system is subject to the risk that the government will eventually run out of funds to provide to ecosystem service providers, either due to budget reasons, or because of overwhelming demand for contracts from landowners. Furthermore, the
system clearly has gaps in its structure, because in Michoacán, the
valuation of services and provision of funds is no longer sufficient
to deter deforestation.
In contrast, the Yasuní Initiative failed to gain funding, despite
its centralized set-up. As a hybrid between pure carbon credit markets and PES, the Initiative was built to run on contributions from
the international community, who would pay to leave the oil in the
ITT in exchange for carbon dioxide credits.265 The Initiative was a
revolutionary concept; instead of foreign entities funding landowners to change their existing land use practices in exchange for an
ecosystem service, foreign entities were being asked to pay a central
government for refraining from even beginning the harmful practice
in exchange for carbon credits.266 As forward thinking as it was, perhaps its untested format and unpredictable results deterred investors
from putting money into the Yasuní ITT Trust Fund. The unprecedented format, economic climate of 2008, and the lack of uniformity
in policy practice and theory on President Correa’s part are the likely
causes of the Yasuní Initiative’s failure. Perhaps if President Correa
had made a showing of faith by contributing government funds to
the program, he could have instilled faith and enticed other investors.
By comparison, Costa Rica has managed to create one of the
world’s most successful conservation programs by raising funds
from diverse sources, and looking forward to achieve financial independence. First, FONAFIFO has set strict eligibility requirements
for landowners, and only distributes funds to landowners who can
provide services that are needed.267 This creates a fluid system
where after old contracts expire, new contracts can be made in areas
where certain desired ecosystem services can be provided.268 Furthermore, FONAFIFO has created a system that accepts diverse
forms of funding, from collecting taxes, to receiving grants and
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loans, and making agreements with private sector investors.269 Having these kinds of flexible, yet constant sources of funding has allowed Costa Rica to begin shifting towards a compulsory system
that taxes users in a particular area where ecosystem services are
needed.270 By doing so, the government is setting itself up to have a
perpetual, relatively constant and predictable source of income to
fund additional PES contracts. Since most countries have some form
of taxation already in place, adding compulsory environmental use
taxes it is a relatively simple solution to funding issues that many
other countries with PES systems could implement.
C.

Recommendations
Author Kelly Carlson suggests five strategies that can be implemented for greater conservation gains, many of which are particularly applicable to Mexico’s PES. First, she suggests decoupling
payments made to landowners from the market value.271 Instead of
assessing the value of land in terms of the value of the commodity
that can be removed from the property, she suggests that conservation payments should “reflect the opportunity cost of keeping the
environment and ecological systems intact.”272 In Mexico, where the
opportunity costs of growing avocados has overcome the value of
keeping the land intact, reassessment of the land’s value and payments that reflect that value may be a necessary step for CONAFOR
moving forward. To take Carlson’s suggestion one step further, the
opportunity costs for every service provided within a target area
needs to be assessed on its own. Landowners in Michoacán may
have different opportunity costs than landowners in Jalisco. And
even within Michoacán, landowners who produce avocados will
have a different opportunity costs than a landowner who grows corn
or berries. The payments must reflect the need for the service, and
be sufficient to incentivize the landowner to participate.
Second, Carlson recommends removing the voluntary offset
payment scheme that many carbon credit schemes follow.273 While
most PES programs do not follow this format, REDD+ is built on it.
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Carlson argues that the sale of carbon credits cannot result in a net
positive outcome for the environment since the purchase of credits
simply allows the purchaser to continue to pollute, thus negating any
positive change realized from conservation efforts.274
Next, Carlson suggests targeting developed countries instead of
developing countries when implementing PES programs, and author
Wunder agrees.275 While it may seem like common sense to implement conservation programs where there is a current or projected
threat, it is likely that the current land uses are already more valuable
than the desired management practices, and so the opportunity costs
and funding into the future would be too high.276 Developed countries on the other hand likely have more reliable government structures with reporting mechanisms, thus making them better suited for
achieving the goals of a PES, and attributing greater value to conservation overall.277
Carlson’s fourth strategy suggests targeting communal property
for conservation efforts.278 Communal property owners provide additional oversight as they govern each other, and rid the implementation process of confusion over property rights and ownership.279
Mexico’s Constitution recognizes two types of communities, the
ejidos, which are established for displaced or landless farmers, and
communidades, which belong to indigenous territories.280 These
groups have naturally implemented conservation efforts through
self-governance, proving that communal property may be a good
target for PES implementation.281 Targeting communal properties
may also secure against leakage, which as discussed above, is the
idea that a landowner may be paid to provide a benefit like forest
conservation on one plot of land, and be simultaneously deforesting
another plot. Where landowners are accountable to others for
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providing a benefit on shared land, the participating owners may be
less likely to act contrary to that purpose.
Finally, Carlson suggests placing focus on financial integrity.282
She argues that having diverse funding schemes, especially through
investment banking, naturally implements additional safeguards and
governance because the banks want to ensure that their contributions
are being used effectively and as intended.283 Therefore, Mexico’s
one-to one market system may be a cause of the lack of safeguards
and oversight that would prevent the kind of deforestation happening because of avocado farming.
Oversight and monitoring are critical components of PES success. Regardless of whether payments are conditional on the participant’s compliance with the land use restrictions imposed, or
whether payments are conditional on actual ecosystem delivery,
monitoring, reporting, and verification needs to take place by the
entity providing the funds. Routine check-ins on the property, drone
surveillance, and GIS mapping could be used to track not only compliance on a parcel of land, but can also be used in the long term to
track additionality and determine whether forests and other visible
environmental services are actually being conserved or restored over
time.
Furthermore, adding mandatory sanctions for landowners who
violate the PES contract they operate under is critical to ensure compliance, deter fraud on the property or fraud in carbon credit sales,
and deter adverse activities. Sanctions can include suspending payments until the landowner brings their property into compliance;
cancellation of payment to a particular landowner, which would also
exclude that participant from re-enrollment on other property; or a
sliding scale of restitution depending on how long the participant
had been enrolled in the program.284
VI.
CONCLUSION
A strong central government, careful implementation, securing
steady funding, and oversight of activities are all key components to
a successful PES program. Mexico has achieved many of these
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goals. Their PES is written into national law through LGDFS, and
enforced by a centralized entity. Mexico is a developed country with
the infrastructure needed to maintain a conservation program, and
has set up a steady source of funding through interest on donations
and by requiring locals to make matching contributions in local programs. However, it may be time for Mexico to re-evaluate its valuation of ecosystem services. In Michoacán, cultivation of avocados
has become so valuable that landowners are clearing sections of forest to plant avocado trees. Mexico has even acknowledged that the
destruction of their forests is due to illegal avocado plantings, particularly in Michoacán, where avocados thrive.285 Despite this public denunciation of the practice, CONAFOR has failed to recognize
the value of avocados as exports and take action to mitigate the impact it is having on ecosystems where avocado plantations thrive.
While the Secretary of Forestry has denounced the illegal practices,
if CONAFOR fails to provide a new, higher valuation for the ecosystem services provided by the forests in Michoacán, or fails to enforce the law more strictly, an important forest ecosystem will be
lost to deforestation.
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